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Introduction*
At the centre of the 1970 and 1980 eruptions of strike
activity culminating in an independent workers'
movement and the formation of Solidarnosc in Poland
was widespread resentment over the acute shortage
and rocketing prices of food. The Polish case well
exemplifies aspects of the long term systemic crisis of
agrarian development which socialist states have
confronted and continue to confront. The Soviet
Union, China, Yugoslavia and Poland, all substantial
food exporters prior to the revolution, became food
importers and, in the Soviet and Chinese cases, two of
the world's largest importers. In recent years,
moreover, each has embarked on a desperate search
for viable agrarian institutions, incentive practices and
marketing relationships. In the Soviet Union the
kolkhoz (collective farm) has declined in importance
vis-à-vis both the sovkhoz (state farm) and an
expanded private sector; Yugoslavia and Poland years
ago acknowledged the failure of collectivisation and
restored private agriculture to a position of
dominance, within a system of restrictive marketing
and purchase practices. China, which appeared until
recently to be the most successful in addressing rural
problems, has since 1978 introduced a wide range of
new incentive, managerial and marketing systems
which some see as the prelude to the abandonment of
collective agriculture, and which unquestionably
mark the most thoroughgoing reforms since the
formation of the communes.
Viewed in global perspective, sustained and growing
food imports by socialist states to combat food
shortages provide dramatic signs of weakness and
incorporation in the capitalist world economy from a
position of vulnerability. Yet the issues of agriculture
cut far deeper to the very heart of socialist
development. This article argues that the unresolved
agrarian question constitutes perhaps the central
dilemma of the political economy of the transition.
With the proliferation of socialist states following
World War II as a result of the expansion of Soviet
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military power in much of Eastern Europe, and with
autonomously generated socialist states in Yugoslavia,
China, Vietnam and Korea, the Soviet state vigorously
pressed collectivisation as the model for universal
implementation, the path for agrarian development
and a centrepiece for the class and accumulation
strategies which were to underlie rapid industriali-
sation. In the late 1940s and early 1950s each new
socialist state, with certain interesting variations, in
turn followed the sequence of land revolution-
imposed collectivisation. Three decades later, despite
widespread criticism of the Stalinist agrarian strategy,
collectivisation remains widely regarded as the central
feature of socialist rural development. And, for all the
human costs imposed and the setbacks dealt to
agrarian development, Soviet style collectivisation is
still widely viewed as essential to Soviet achievements
of high accumulation and rapid industrialisation.
This article addresses two issues:
- the origins of cooperative and collective approaches
to the 'agrarian question' in Marxist and Leninist
thought and early Soviet practice;
- the formative experience of the Soviet Union
culminating in 'the great turn' in the years 1928-33 as
the socialist model for agrarian development, and its
consequences for Soviet socialism.
Its goal is to rediscover the most promising elements of
theory and praxis toward the creation of a socialist
agrarian strategy, and to explore the problems and
limits of previous approaches. Its premise is that the
agrarian question continues to bedevil all socialist
societies committed to the full development of the
productive forces and to the flowering of socially
rooted cooperative institutions.
The 'Agrarian Question': from Marx to
Engels to Lenin
If the writings and politics of the mature Marx reflect a
preoccupation with the proletariat and capitalist
development, he also wrote extensively on important
aspects of what came to be called the 'agrarian
question' {Draper 1978:317-452].
In an important passage in the section on 'So-called
primitive accumulation' in Capital I, Marx summed
up the shared limitations of pre-capitalist forms of
small-scale peasant agriculture and artisanal industry:
this mode of production presupposes the frag-
mentation of holdings, and the dispersal of the
other means of production. As it excludes the
concentration of these means of production, so it
also excludes co-operation, division of labour
within each separate process of production, the
social control and regulation of the forces of
society. [Marx 1867:927-8]
Marx assumed that capitalist development on a world
scale would sweep away all vestiges of such a
fragmented 'mode of production' [Marx 1867:9281.
Quite incorrectly, both because the household farm
has shown extraordinary vigour and resilience under
capitalism and because it has been left to socialist
revolution everywhere to confront its living legacy in
myriad forms of peasant agriculture.
While Marx perceived in the small-scale, fragmented
pattern of peasant agriculture a barrier to cooperative
production, the division of labour, and the develop-
ment of the productive forces, he did not rely on the
objective workings of capital and the market to solve
the agrarian question. We find in Marx the origins of
the concept of the worker-peasant alliance as the
bulwark of proletarian revolution. While viewing the
rural proletariat as the most important ally in the
countryside, Marx insisted that it was possible and
necessary to win over to the revolutionary camp at
least a portion of the peasantry. But how? While Marx,
as a revolutionary, never unequivocally ruled out land
redistributive strategies, his approach to the agrarian
question centred on the eventual elimination of
private land ownership and the socialisation of
agricultural production. This perspective was mediated
by a clear awareness of the necessity for revolutionaries
to develop an agrarian strategy based solidly on the
protection of peasant interests and winning active
peasant support. Marx's notes on a polemic of
Bakunin make the point well. The proletariat, he
insisted, must:
take measures whereby the peasant sees his
situation immediately improved and which there-
fore win him over to the revolution - measures
however, which in embryo facilitate the transition
from private property in land to collective
property, so that the peasant comes to it by himself,
for economic reasons. [Draper 1978:409]
The convoluted quality of this formulation suggests
one of the most difficult challenges which socialist
revolutionaries would everywhere confront in the
twentieth century.
In his final work addressed to the peasant question,
Friedrich Engels envisaged that large landed estates
would be 'organised into cooperatives . . . under the
control of the community'. 'The example of these
agricultural cooperatives' he held, 'would convince
also the last of the still resistant small-holding
peasants, and surely also many big peasants, of the
advantages of cooperative, large-scale production'.
The peasantry, would be won to the virtues of large-
scale cooperative agriculture by the power of example,
not, as all agreed, by coercion.
Lenin and the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917,
sharing many of the perspectives on the agrarian
question of Marx and Engels enumerated above. In
1907, to clear the land 'of all medieval lumber', Lenin
had urged 'the nationalisation of the land, the
abolition of the private ownership of land, and
transfer of all the land to the state, which will mark a
complete break with feudal relations in the country-
side' [Lenin 1907:169]. In his April 1917 Theses and
then in the Bolshevik Party's resolution on the
agrarian question, however, Lenin combined the
principle of land nationalisation with 'the immediate
transfer of all lands to the peasantry organised in
Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, or in other organs of
local self-government elected in a really democratic
way and entirely independent of the landlords and
officials'. In short, the right to cultivation of the
nationalised land is vested 'in local democratic
institutions' [Lenin 1917:190]. However, it is by no
means clear whether the power of 'organs of local
self-government' implied a shift to cooperative forms
of agricultural production or whether it simply
marked the Bolshevik acceptance of household based
agricultural production. The attempt to win the
support of the peasantry, coupled with the absence of
any significant Bolshevik presence in the rural areas,
resulted in the abandonment of nationalisation in
favour of the programme long advocated by the Social
Revolutionaries in which land-hungry peasants were
encouraged to seize and subdivide the large estates
into individually cultivated holdings [Hussain and
Tribe 1981:80-99]. Land parcellisation and redistri-
bution thus entered the Bolshevik arsenal as a weapon
which stood in direct conflict with the principal
strategies advanced earlier by Marx, Engels and Lenin
himself; such land reform was carried out in virtually
all subsequent socialist revolutions with the exception
of Cuba.
It is customary to pass quickly over the policies of the
War Communism period (1917-20) as a set of
exceptional emergency measures whose excesses were
rapidly corrected by the New Economic Policy (NEP).
But as the Hungarian economist Laszlo Szamuely has
convincingly demonstrated, regardless of the impact
of war, the policies of this period - the creation of a
centralised subsistence economy, abolition of money
and commodity relations, heavy reliance on com-
pulsory labour mobilisation and egalitarian distri-
bution - embodied shared concepts of the transition
period held by all leading ßolsheviks from Bukharin
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and Trotsky to Preobrazhensky and Lenin [Szamuely
1974:10-44])
If the Bolsheviks entered 1917 with at best weak
linkages to the peasant majority, under War
Communism the Soviet state and the peasantry
clashed head on as a result of state imposed grain sales
and outright confiscation. When the proposal to
exchange commodities for grain produced insufficient
supplies to feed the cities, a decree of 9 May 1918 set
compulsory sales quotas for peasants and called on
urban workers and poor peasants to confiscate
'surplus' grain. The free market in grain was thus
legally abolished, though it continued to exist illicitly
[Szamuely 1977:16-17]. These were emergency
measures taken in response to the wartime crisis, but
at another level they were consistent with certain
characteristic Bolshevik approaches to the peasantry.
The failure of compulsion to solve the supply crisis led
Lenin to conceptualise the course which eventually
came to be dubbed the New Economic Policy. In 1919
Lenin analysed the problem of the transformation of
the peasantry as a complex and long process. It is
necessary, he wrote,
to abolish the difference between working-man and
peasant, to make them all workers. This cannot be
done all at once. This task is incomparably more
difficult and will of necessity be a protracted one. It
is not a problem that can be solved by
overthrowing a class. It can be solved only by the
organisational reconstruction of the whole social
economy, by a transition from individual,
disunited, petty commodity production to large
scale social production. This transition must by
necessity be extremely protracted. It may only be
delayed and complicated by hasty and incautious
administrative and legislative measures. It can be
accelerated only by affording such assistance to the
peasant as will enable him immensely to improve
his whole agricultural technique, to reform it
radically. [Lenin 1919:318]
In 1923, in the final year of his life, Lenin began to
focus on the importance of cooperatives as the
centrepieces of state policy during the transition to
socialism in the countryside. But he had in mind not
the peasant communes (kommuna) which had
flowered briefly with some official support in 19 18-19
and which organised production and consumption on
a basis of equal sharing. Rather, with the state
guaranteeing private ownership and cultivation of
land in the NEP, and with the Bolsheviks still lacking a
firm base in the countryside, Lenin's call for
cooperatives focused on trading cooperatives. With
this as a first step toward winning peasant support for
protosocialist institutions, and after the technological
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revolution (tractors, electricity, chemical fertiliser)
made possible an appropriate material basis, Lenin
held, collectivisation of agriculture would then
become feasible [Lenin 1923:708]. Both material and
political preparations for collectivised agriculture
would require painstaking efforts but it was hoped
that the peasant could be led to socialism by the power
of cooperative example, strengthened by the technical-
material support of the state. State policies would
ensure that the peasantry would gradually come to
recognise that large-scale collective agriculture was in
its direct material interest, and the urban-rural gap
could gradually be narrowed.
The core of NEP practice was not gradual cooperation
but the attempt to win peasant support and to obtain
much needed grain through the revival of market
mechanisms - including free markets and the
payment of higher state purchasing prices designed to
stimulate increased production and sales. Yet as the
1920s advanced, despite economic recovery (and in
part because of it), conflict between the peasantry and
the Soviet state over the grain issue deepened, calling
into question fundamental principles of NEP and the
future of Soviet socialism.
The Great Turn: Imposed Collectivisation as
'Socialist Agrarian Policy'
Imposed collectivisation, the centrepiece of Soviet
agrarian policy since 1929, indeed of the entire
political economy constructed under Stalin's leader-
ship, was inflicted by the Soviet state over the
opposition of al/rural classes, and at immense human
and material cost for the long-term prospects of the
countryside and agrarian development. This form of
collectivisation constituted the negation of the
soundest elements of the Marxist and Leninist visions
of socialist transformation, and particularly of the
processes of gradual, voluntary cooperation which
Lenin had envisaged, though done little to implement.
This was by far the most ambitious institutional
restructuring attempted in the entire history of the
Soviet Union and of other socialist countries which
have implemented collectivisation. In no other sector
have the relations of production, including ownership,
labour process and remuneration, been so funda-
mentally transformed. Yet imposed collectivisation
was the product of no articulated strategy on the part
of Stalin or others; still less was there advance
understanding or agreement within the top Bolshevik
leadership, although we note certain significant
continuities of approach and political style with the
politics of War Communism.
Ç,ar,o,elv trarec the origins of the War Communism anoroach to As of 1929, the structural and organisational
earlier social democratic theoreticians, including Kautsky. parameters of collective institutions had been neither
designed nor tested, though some useful experience
with small-scale cooperation had been gained. In the
late 1920s, 36 research institutes were studying
problems of industrialisation; not one was engaged in
research on agriculture [Lewin 1968:353].
Because of its immense influence on all subsequent
socialist attempts to forge an agrarian policy, we will
attempt to reconstruct the origins of the Soviet drive to
collectivisation which, once underway, produced the
'Great Turn', and to assess the consequences of
collectivisation within the larger parameters of Soviet
socialist development.
What process led the Soviet Union from the policy
constellation associated with NEP to instant imposed
collectivisation and the mass deportation of the
'kulaks'? The answers to this question lie embedded in
the crisis of accumulation and marketed grain which
confronted the Soviet state in the mid-1920s.
Without minimising the extraordinary economic and
political challenges which the first socialist state
confronted in the 1920s as initial hopes for the
universal spread of revolution and support for its
industrialising plans were dashed, it must be
emphasized that the heart of the problem of the grain
shortages of the late 1920s lay in state pricing and
marketing policies which wreaked havoc with the
peasantry. By the mid-1920s, policies associated with
the NEP had succeeded in stimulating the agrarian
economy which was then organised on a household
basis: by 1926 agriculture had regained, and livestock
exceeded, pre-war production levels - though grain
production was still just 92 per cent of the pre-war high
[Lewin 1968:172; Davies 1980a:3].2 The central
problem, however, lay with marketed grain, which in
1926 was approximately 10 mn tons compared with
18.8 mn tons in 1913 - the record year. In 1926, the
state slashed purchasing prices for grain by 20-25 per
cent, attacked peasant private trade and cut back
sharply on the provision of industrial goods to the
rural areas. The inevitable results of this onslaught
against NEP and the peasantry included peasant
efforts to shift from grain to the production of other
crops; to channel larger quantities of grain toward
livestock rather than the market; and to sell the
maximum possible in private markets which offered
substantially higher prices than those offered by the
state [Nove 197 1:70-1]. Where Bukharin continued to
talk about the need for progress 'at a snail's pace'
based on wooing the peasantry, the 1926 policies
marked the victory of Preobrazhensky and others who
stressed the use of price and sale quota mechanisms to
siphon resources from the peasantry as the foundation
for primitive socialist accumulation and industriali-
'R. W. Davies describes the peasant economy in the years 1922-26 as
a brilliant success'.
sation [Preobrazhensky 1926:30, 84,88; Nove 1965-
xi-xii].
The critical problem with this strategy was that it
acutely aggravated the very difficulty it was designed
to solve. By 1928, grain procurements were just half
those of the peak pre-war year and the Soviet Union
had ceased to be a grain exporter. It was at precisely
this moment, as Soviet planners attempted to launch
their ambitious first Five Year Plan with its focus on
industrialisation and the necessity to secure foreign
exchange, that the grain shortage assumed crisis
dimensions [Lewin 1968:172].
In 1928 collectivisation was on the lips of no leading
Soviet official; the order of the day was the extraction
of substantially larger quantities of grain from a
reluctant peasantry. Stalin led the procurement drive,
personally pinpointing 'kulak sabotage' as the heart of
the problem and then imposing coercive approaches
to grain extraction which struck at all rural classes
[Lewin 1968:214-44; Davies l980a:56-97]. The military
language and methods of the drive recreated the
atmosphere of War Communism throughout the
countryside.
Was there in fact a 'kulak' problem and, if so, in what
did it consist? Policies associated with NEP had made
possible (even encouraged) a degree of rural class
differentiation, and it is unquestionably true that there
are observable tendencies throughout the 1920s for a
small number of middle peasants to become rich
peasants while others declined to the ranks of poor
and landless peasants. The central fact, however, is
that as a result of state extraction and controls on
marketing policies, by 1928 no powerful 'kulak' class
had emerged. The most important tendency of the
preceding years was the strengthening of the ranks of
the serednyaks (middle peasants who produced a
modest surplus) who, according to Strumilin and the
Central Statistical Board, in 1926-27 accounted for
68 per cent of the rural population [Bettelheim
1978:87-8]. Estimates of the 'kulak' population vary
between two and five per cent and Kritsman observed
that only one per cent of the farms hired more than one
labourer. In the agitprop of the grain confiscation
drive, the 'kulak' was portrayed as the enemy and
target, but the reality was that most of the grain was
actually requisitioned from the ranks of the much
larger serednyak group [Lewin 1968:69-78]. The small
'kulak' group neither controlled the lion's share of
grain surplus nor distinguished themselves in
sabotaging state procurement plans. As E. H. Carr
aptly observed, 'it was no longer true that class
analysis determined policy. Policy determined what
form of class analysis was appropriate to the given
situation' [Carr 1964:99].
In April-May 1929, at the height of the grain crisis, the
Soviet Union hastily drafted and launched its first Five
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Year Plan projecting grandiose targets, including a 2.5
fold increase in investment (3.2 times optimal) and
annual industrial growth rates of 21.5 per cent (25.2
per cent optimal). The goal was an 81.6 per cent rise in
national income (103 per cent optimal) and, according
to the plan, working people would share the benefits:
real wages were slated to rise for industrial workers by
58 per cent (71 per cent optimal) and for agricultural
workers by 30 per cent [Lewin 1968:344-5]. The plan
was predicated on the expansion of the sovkhoz and
kolkhoz sector to account for 13 per cent of the sown
grain acreage and 32 per cent of the nation's marketed
grain by 1932 [Lewin 1968:353-4]. The reality proved
quite different.
Before turning to that reality, it is worth recalling the
outlines of the agrarian strategy being discussed in
1928 and early 1929. In the short run, the vast majority
of the peasantry was to be linked to the state plan not
by the immediate transformation of production
relations but through contractual relations committing
it to the sale of fixed quantities of grain to the state.
The state would gradually encourage and support
kolkhoz formation over a five-year period to include
4.5 mn households. The concentration of the 120,000
available tractors in the kolkhozes was to provide a
demonstration effect of the merits of socialised
farming to the peasant majority of private cultivators.
The growth of industry, meanwhile, .would make
possible substantial increases in the production of
tractors, agricultural machinery and chemical fertilizer,
the material base for an industrialised collective
agriculture. As Lewïn has observed, 'the question of
mass collectivisation affecting the majority of the
peasantry was one which had not even arisen. . . there
was general acceptance of the principle that both
large-scale agricultural production and collectivisation
could only be introduced gradually, as material
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circumstances permitted' [Lewin 1968:355-7]. The
experiments with mechanised collectives and the
expanded production of the means of mechanisation
would provide the experience, the material found-
ations, and the desire on the part of the majority of
peasants voluntarily to join large-scale collectives.
This approach was obliterated in the 'Great Turn' of
1929. The grain procurement drive swiftly turned into
an onslaught against the 'kulaks' which in turn gave
way to command collectivisation which within a
matter of weeks forced millions to give up their land
and join collectives whose methods of operation and
remuneration remained unknown.
Proclaiming that millions of peasants now favoured
collectivisation, Stalin, in 1929 suddenly, without
warning or preparation, launched the collectivisation
drive demanding the formation of giant multi-village
kolkhozes of up to 10,000 hectares at the same time
that the call went out to complete the Five Year Plan in
four years [Lewin 1968:428, 456]. By June 1929 the
euphoria of instant transformation wedded to
giantism swept aside earlier discussions of technical
and political preconditions. Until that moment the
notion that 'millions of sokhi (wooden ploughs) all
added together would make an imposing sum' was a
matter of ridicule. Now it suddenly became reality
[Lewin 1968:460]. Not only land but livestock and
household plots were collectivised (that is, con-
fiscated), and a wage system was to provide
remuneration [Davies 1980b:172]. The form of
collectivisation was thus a virtually complete break
with household based agriculture.
In his March 1930 statement, 'Dizzy with Success',
Stalin, noting that 50 per cent of the peasants had
already joined collectives, proclaimed that 'a radical
The concentration ol tite I 21)00(1 available tractors in the kolkhozes
was to provide a demonstration effect of the merits of socialised
farming. - millions of sokhi all added tOgether
turn of the countryside towards socialism may be
considered as already achieved' [Stalin 1930:197]. This
signalled the start of a period of consolidation and
compromise in which the Soviet leadership retreated
from some of the most extreme and unworkable
features of the kolkhozes [Stalin 1930:199]. As a result
there was a sharp drop in cooperative enrolment -
how many represented massive defections and how
many of those officially enrolled existed in name only,
we cannot know. Between 10 March, when 58 per cent
of peasant households were reportedly kolkhoz
members, and 1 June the number dropped to 23.6 per
cent for the entire USSR, that is, more than half the
reported members defected, and in some areas like the
Central Black region membership plummetted from
82 per cent of the population in March to less than 16
per cent by June [Nove 197 1:89]. Several more years
would be required to complete collectivisation
throughout the Soviet countryside, but the direction
and nature of the kolkhozes was essentially set with the
series of compromises put in place in 1930. The
synthesis which emerged at this time would
characterise the central strands of Soviet agriculture,
and indeed important elements continue unchanged to
the present.
The essential elements of the Soviet agricultural
synthesis were these [Millar forthcoming; Davies
1980b; Lewin 1968]:
- state imposed collectivisation. The large kolkhoz
became the centrepiece and norm of Soviet
agriculture, institutionalising the preference for
giantism which finds its parallel in the structure of
Soviet industry. In return for the loss of private lands,
the kolkhoz member received income not in the form
of wages as originally proposed in 1929 but as a share
of collective production. This took the form of
payment in cash and kind for labour days contributed;
- the private plot and the right to maintain livestock.
Initially eliminated during kolkhoz formation, the
private sector was quickly restored as a crucial element
in the uneasy quid pro quo between the peasant and
the state, and between central plan and market. The
contribution of collective labour thus became the
precondition for access to the private plot and to
raising livestock, pigs, etc. Since the l930s the
household has produced a significant portion of
Soviet meat, vegetables and fruit, contributed a
substantial share of rural income and preserved the
household-based structure of rural life;
- the centralised command procurement structure.
This provided the regime with the principle channel
for ensuring continued supplies of marketed grain,
other foods and commercial crops for the cities,
industry, and as a source of foreign exchange. State
prices and fixed quotas (with above quota bonuses)
provided the structure of control which regulated
agricultural sales and integrated agriculture within
state plans;
- access to private markets. This was the quid pro
quo at the heart of marketing arrangements, precisely
parallel to and functionally integrated with private
plots in the productive sector. Household plots and
private markets were essential elements of the
compromise erected following collectivisation; the
complementary systems nevertheless existed in uneasy
conflict. They survived precisely because of the vital
contribution which the private sector made to Soviet
consumption and to peasant willingness to participate
in the collective;
- machine tractor stations (MTS) serve the
collectives. The MTS was the technological link
between state and collective, the channel for
disseminating tractors, fertiliser and machinery, and
an important outlet for extracting the produce of the
countryside. In the name of efficiency, the kolkhozes
were simultaneously deprived of direct control over
advanced technology and firmly lashed through the
MTS to the state;
- the plan as a teleological weapon of the state. This
characteristic feature was intimately bound up with
the 'Great Leap' mentality which surfaced in 1929 and
periodically thereafter, the Stalin cult which likewise
may be said to have made its real debut in the same
year, and the manipulation of class struggle categories
to justify state compulsion.
As agrarian strategy, the Soviet Union's abrupt
coercive collectivisation has had few defenders in
recent years.3 The combination of the peasant's
revenge in the form of the slaughter of close to half the
nation's livestock, and subsequent problems of
collective organisations and motivation, have con-
tributed to chronic agricultural problems manifest in
low productivity and food shortages. Nevertheless, the
view remains widespread, particularly among many
Third World activists, that whatever the human costs
and err?rs associated with collectivisation, whatever
the long-range setback to agricultural production and
peasant interests, collectivisation was a necessary
precondition for the crowning achievement of the
Soviet regime. On foundations of collectivisation rose
the industrial structure which enabled the Soviet
Union to survive the Nazi onslaught in World War II
and subsequently to emerge as a major industrial
power. For many, the 'Soviet model' consists precisely
of rapid industrialisation made possible by accumu-
lation following the collective path.
The Soviet researcher, A. A. Barsov, has effectively
cut the ground from under this argument. To be sure,
3One positive recent appraisal of the accomplishments of Soviet
socialism, including the major directions of the Stalin period, ignores
totally the agrarian sector and issues associated with collectivisation
to Soviet industrialisation! See Szymanski [1979].
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Barsov's study sought to refute the 'petty bourgeois
falsifiers' who claimed that Soviet industrialisation
rested on the exploitation of the peasantry. But
working closely with urban-rural and state-collective
capital flows for the 1930s he has shown that in the
1930s the state was forced to subsidise agriculture
heavily, both directly in the form of subsidies to the
MTS and sovkozes, and through changing terms of
trade favourable to the countryside. The state did
squeeze the countryside of the agricultural surplus,
but costly and inefficient Soviet collectivised agri-
culture actually required substantial state subsidies
both in the short and long run [Millar 1970, 1974}.
Far from providing the surplus which fuelled Soviet
industrialisation, following collectivisation the net
resource flow was to the countryside.
In his study of Socialist Planning, Michael Eliman
sums up the Marxist case for collectivised agriculture:
first, it prevents rural exploitation, that is tise
emergence of a rural proletariat side by side with an
agrarian càpitalist class. Secondly, it allows the
rational use of the available resources. Thirdly, it
ensures a rapid growth of the marketed output of
agriculture. Fourthly, it provides a large source of
accumulation. [1979:81]
To the above we may add the belief that large-scale
cooperative or collective agriculture can both
outproduce private agriculture to assure higher and
more equal incomes for all rural producers, and can
support institutions which vest substantial control
over the land and its product in the hands of the
immediate producers.
If our analysis is correct, Soviet approaches to
collectivisation in the 1930s, approaches which
essentially declared war on the peasantry and set back
the development of Soviet agriculture, achieved few if
any of these goals. Rather collectivisation provided
the crucible within which many of the most
anachronistic elements of Soviet state socialism took
shape, including the antagonistic relationship between
the state and the peasantry, the emergence of the cult
of personality, and the foreclosure of the development
of democratic processes. Collectivisation, moreover,
not only set back rural development by decades, but it
also may have drained rather than stimulated overall
development, including industrialisation.
That alternative vision of a socialist agrarian policy
which we found articulated in various ways in the
writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin has yet to be
seriously tested. In diverse ways socialist states
4For a dissenting view emphasizing the contribution of coflectivisation
to Soviet industrialisation, see Eilman [1975].
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continue to search for solutions to the problems
generated by imposed collectivisation, with experi-
mentation centred thus far on redefining the
relationship between plan and market and among
state, collective and private sectors and searching for
greater latitude for the market and private sectors. But
a variety of other, perhaps more basic, issues remain
open. These include the relative merits of cooperative,
collective and state ownership and organisational
forms from the perspectives of stimulating accumu-
lation and development of the productive forces,
building democratic institutions responsive to member
needs within the larger context of national planning,
and appropriate scale of production at different levels
of technology. A fresh consideration of the essential
premises of socialist agriculture is long overdue.
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